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An Apocalyptic Moment: 
Mackenzie King and the Bomb 
Historians of Canadian foreign policy have not much troubled themselves with the debate over the wisdom of dropping the 
atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. This is 
perhaps understandable given that Ottawa had little say in how, 
when, or where the weapons would be used. Instead, historians have 
focused their attention on a single passage in Prime Minister W.L. 
Mackenzie King's diary and concluded that he supported the Amer­
ican decision to use the bomb because he was an uncaring racist 
who gave as much thought to winning the Glengarry by-election as 
he did to the 80,000 Japanese who perished under the nuclear cloud 
over Hiroshima. "Mr. King, in particular," Stephen Salaff has con­
tended, "was armoured against moral and ethical restraints by a life-
rime of political trade in prejudice - with racial and social class 
stereotyping of immigrant Japanese."1 
A closer examination of the evidence reveals that Mackenzie 
King did not support deploying the atomic bomb on racist grounds. 
In fact, it is questionable that he supported using the bomb at all. 
The prime minister did not view the bomb as a legitimate weapon 
of war and he looked forward to the day it would be used with a 
strong sense of impending doom. Nevertheless, despite these mis­
givings, it would be a considerable oversimplification to portray 
Mackenzie King as the embodiment of moral wisdom. By the time 
the bomb was dropped, the prime minister had manoeuvred himself 
into a position from which he could afford to express doubts about 
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using it. He had no intention of allowing Canada to play a large role 
in the final invasion of Japan and, unlike American leaders, he did 
not have to face the question of what that decision might cost. 
Mackenzie King's attitude toward the atomic bomb took shape 
gradually after he learned in June 1942 that Canada had deposits of 
the mineral necessary for building a nuclear device. At that time his 
major preoccupation was winning the war and the side which pos­
sessed the mineral, he noted in his diary, "in time would unques­
tionably win the war with its power of destruction."2 The actual 
development ot the atomic bomb, however, proceeded slowly. In 
August 1943, for example, Sir John Anderson, lord president of the 
council, told Mackenzie King that it would be at least two years 
before an atomic weapon could be produced.3 The prime ministers 
interest in the bomb was sporadic throughout 1943 and 1944, prob­
ably because he left the details of Canada's role to the 'minister of 
everything.' C D . Howe, and the president of the National Research 
Council, C.J. Mackenzie. Nonetheless, in April 1944, he made the 
first ot many references in his diary to the "appalling possibilities of 
enormous destruction."4 
Mackenzie King used these words, "appalling" and "destruc­
tion," with increasing frequency in the months before Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. But there was something else that began to play on 
the prime minister's mind. After learning in early February 1945 that 
the atomic project was nearing completion and Japan would be the 
likely target, he began to express a strong sense of impending terror 
and doom. On 24 February, Mackenzie King and Malcolm Mac-
Donald, the British high commissioner in Canada, discussed the 
bomb over dinner. The conversation revolved around the question 
ot "what the mere possession of it is likely to mean in perpetuating 
dread among the nations through years to come once its existence 
and powers are known." Mackenzie King's answer was not opti­
mistic. "It could mean," he wrote in his diary, "the destruction of 
civilization."' 
The themes of personal horror, mass destruction, terror and 
doom started to dominate the prime minister's thinking by the sum­
mer ot 1945. On 15 July, he recorded in his diary that "I learned 
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from Howe tonight very secretly that we might within a couple of 
weeks see the new weapon in use which would be terribly destruc­
tive. It appals me to think of what may be involved in even attempt­
ing its use."6 The next day the United States successfully detonated 
the first nuclear device at Alamogordo, New Mexico. A week and a 
half later, on 27 July, when rumours were circulating to the effect 
that Japan would reject the Potsdam ultimatum to surrender, 
Mackenzie King was convinced that the ultimatum itself had been 
delivered with an ulterior motive, namely, "to prepare the world 
even more than the Japanese for their certain doom in the immedi­
ate future." His thoughts on that occasion are worth quoting at 
length: 
Within a few days at the latest the power of the atomic 
bomb will be disclosed and with it Japan will be faced with 
either immediate complete surrender or complete devasta­
tion within a very short time. It is well that the world itself 
is being prepared for the revelation which the knowledge of 
the existence of this new weapon will disclose. I feel that we 
are approaching a moment of terror to mankind, for it 
means that, under the stress of war, men have at last not only 
found but created the Frankenstein which conceivably 
could destroy the human race.7 
Just two days before the explosion over Hiroshima, Mackenzie 
King was again, as he put it in his diary, "thinking a great deal of the 
moment for the dropping of the atomic bomb." He had hoped that 
the American president, Harry Truman, and the British prime min­
ister, Clement Attlee, would manage to convince the Soviet Union 
to help end the war quickly and avoid using the bomb. Increasing­
ly that seemed unlikely.8 To the sense of doom was now added a 
feeling of remorse. "It makes one very sad at heart," he wrote, "to 
think of the loss of life that it [the bomb] will occasion among inno­
cent people as well as those that are guilty."9 
Clearly, the evidence does not support the picture of the prime 
minister as an uncaring racist that is so often painted by historians. 
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That assessment emerges from the unfortunate diary entry Macken­
zie King penned the day the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. "We 
can now see," he wrote, "what might have come to the British race 
had German scientists won the race. It is fortunate that the use of 
the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the 
white races of Europe." 1 0 
There are two basic points to be made with respect to this pas­
sage. First, historians caught up in the narrow obsession with sniff­
ing out racists have misread it; the second sentence cannot be 
divorced from the first. If the Germans had developed the bomb 
before the allies there can be little doubt that Hider would have used 
it on Britain. Hence, in the second sentence Mackenzie King was 
really only remarking how fortunate it was for the allies that the 
bomb was released over Japan instead of upon Britain. Historians 
have assumed that because the prime minister referred to "the white 
races of Europe" he was alluding to the use of the bomb on Ger­
many; that is simply not the idea that flows from the first sentence. 
Second, it cannot be denied that Mackenzie King functioned in 
a historical context that was, in contemporary terms, racist. That he 
supported dropping the bomb on racial grounds is less certain. As 
James Eayrs has pointed out, Mackenzie King was more sensitive 
than most of his countrymen to the fate of the victims of the 
atom. 1 1 Some of that sensitivity was evident when the second bomb 
was dropped and when he learned of the losses incurred in the 
Hiroshima explosion. Mackenzie King described the destruction as 
"appalling." His sense of doom was now perhaps stronger than ever: 
"We have certainly reached the moment of frightfulness which has 
been the ambition of German philosophers. They have come to the 
acme of the creation of the Frankenstein monster. Nothing but 
Christianity can now save the world." 1 2 Accordingly, the Prime 
Minister turned to the bible in an effort to come to terms with the 
bomb: 
I again had the book of Isaiah and again it seemed to have 
been specially sent. It opened out at Chapter XIV with the 
words: 'How hath the oppressor ceased! the golden city 
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ceased! .... The whole earth is at rest, and is quiet: they break 
forth into singing.' Then the words; 'How art thou fallen 
from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning' which marked 
fittingly the fate of Hider and equally the fate today of 
Japan's Emperor. ... Looking anew at the book, I see I have 
underlined the lines: 'And it shall come to pass in the day 
that the Lord shall give thee rest from thy sorrow, and from 
thy fear, and from the hard bondage wherein thou wast 
made to serve.' Then too were the words related to the ser­
pent: 'For out of the serpent's root shall come forth a cock­
atrice, and his fruit shall be a fiery flying serpent.' And a lit-
de further down: 'There shall come from the north a smoke 
and none shall be alone in his appointed times.' 'What shall 
one then answer the messengers of the nation? That the 
Lord hath founded Zion, and the poor of his people shall 
trust in it.' 'From the north a smoke' - there is something 
that foretells the atomic bomb. 1 3 
In this regard, Mackenzie King's attitude contrasted starkly with 
that of many of his compatriots. C.J. Mackenzie, for instance, later 
recalled that he did not "remember feeling anything special. It's dif­
ficult to be philosophical when you're in action. And you must 
remember we were all out for blood at that particular time. I didn't 
have to ponder the rights or wrongs of the bomb."1 4 
Nevertheless, for all the guilt and remorse Mackenzie King 
expressed in the privacy of his diary, some caution must be exercised 
before concluding that he was a person of deep humanitarian 
instincts. He may have believed that the dropping of the bomb was 
unnecessary and perhaps even immoral — there can be no doubt of 
bis sincerity on that score. It fits well with his Christianity and his 
strong personal aversion to war. But the prime minister had some 
not altogether altruistic reasons for expressing himself the way he 
did. 
Throughout 1944 and 1945 Mackenzie King had received 
reports from various sources pointing to the rapid decline of Japan. 
In July 1944 Norman Robertson, the under-secretary of state for 
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i•xtcrnal affairs, sent Mackenzie King a copy of an intercepted 
telegram from the |apanese foreign minister to his representative in 
Rangoon. The foreign minister reported that the "whole war situa­
tion has become still more serious and tense." The United States had 
penetrated japan's "special zone of defence" and continued bomb­
ing raids would destroy its resources and reduce war production. 
The minister claimed that the situation was compounded by the 
deterioration of public order" in the Greater East Asia area and 
signs that collaborating nations would abandon the fight.1 5 In for­
warding this piece of news, Robertson pointedly noted that it was 
"very encouraging." The prime minister also received reports from 
London, especially after March 1945, which painted a similar pic­
ture The administration in Tokyo seemed to be changing overnight, 
imports into Japan had nearly been cut off, air raids were over­
whelming Japan's civil defence, war production was seriously ham­
pered, and as early as May 1945, there was talk of Japan accepting 
"peace tantamount to unconditional surrender."1 6 
It was a bleak picture indeed. However, against these accounts 
Mackenzie King had to balance other reports which told a different 
story. For example, in November 1944, Lester Pearson, then serving 
in Washington, sent Ottawa a report of a meeting he had arranged 
with Admiral Somerville, chief of the British naval mission in Wash­
ington. According to Pearson, Somerville said that the American 
claims of victories over Japan were "greatly exaggerated." Although 
Somerville conceded that the Japanese fleet was"gready weakened" 
he warned against underrating Japanese capabilities. He pointed out 
that the Japanese fleet had come perilously close to scoring an 
important victory over Admiral Halsey south of Formosa and only 
sheer good luck had saved the Americans.1 7 
In a similar vein, Winston Churchill informed Mackenzie King 
m late February 1945 that it would take eighteen months to defeat 
Japan after the defeat of Germany.1" Some of the sting in that figure 
was removed when Mackenzie King visited President Roosevelt in 
early March 1945. The president told him that it would take only 
three months to bring Japan to its knees. Although the former 
American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, warned the prime 
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minister that the allies would be in for a tough fight, Mackenzie 
King seemed, rather uncharacteristically, to look at the bright side.1 9 
In a June conversation with the South African prime minister, Jan 
Smuts, he mentioned a telegram he had received from Victor 
Odium, Canada's ambassador to China. Like Grew, Oldum warned 
that the war against Japan would last some time because the Japan­
ese were so "fanatical." Mackenzie King disagreed. He told Smuts 
that he "did not see how with the bombing what it would be, that 
the war could very well run on much beyond this year."20 Over the 
next month the prime minister revised that figure so that by mid-
July he was forecasting a much earlier defeat: 
Japan is getting a thoroughly good pounding. My own feel­
ing is the war might conceivably end within a fortnight 
either through use of new weapons destroying naval ports 
and threatening to destroy all other industrial cities of Japan 
in quick order, or through word that Russia has decided to 
come into the war.... the main island Honshu is almost cer­
tain to be all but blasted out of existence within a month, 
should die war continue that long. 2 1 
Mackenzie King's belief in the rapid demise of Japan and the 
hopes he pinned on an eventual Russian entry into the war 
deserve some attention because there is so much controversy sur­
rounding these developments and the subsequent use of the 
atomic bomb. A number of scholars have been extremely critical 
of Truman's decision to use atomic weapons on the grounds that 
such a show of strength was completely unnecessary. American 
leaders, so the general argument goes, knew Japan was on its knees 
and therefore near surrender. After all, Tokyo had made peace 
overtures. Moreover, given the state of Japan's military capabilities, 
the planned invasion would have cost few American lives and cer­
tainly fewer lives than were lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.2 2 
Material in the Canadian archives casts some, but by no means 
sufficient, light on these matters. 
Ottawa had been receiving various reports and rumours of 
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Japanese peace feelers from American, British and even Australian 
sources since September 1944. 2 3 All turned out to be untrue. The 
last of these reports arrived from London just four days before the 
bombing of Hiroshima. In it the secretary of state for dominion 
affairs informed the Canadian prime minister that the Soviet Union 
had received from Japan a request to act as mediator between Japan 
and Britain and the United States. A former Japanese prime minis­
ter. Prince Konoye, was to act as envoy with the special authority of 
the emperor. According to British authorities, Stalin dismissed the 
approach as "simply a further attempt to obtain the collaboration of 
the Soviet Government in the furtherance of Japanese policy."2 4 
The failure of Japanese attempts to sue for peace helps explain 
why Mackenzie King wanted the Soviet Union to enter the war 
against Japan. He believed it would mean an early victory which 
would mean little or no use of Canadian forces. Canada had played 
a very limited role in the Pacific war and Mackenzie King was deter­
mined to keep it that way. He had no desire to suffer another disas­
ter like Hong Kong. True, Canada had agreed to participate in the 
Pacific war at the second Quebec Conference in 1944. It was also 
true that the prime minister made a considerable fuss about this 
decision in the House of Commons in April 1945. The following 
month he gave a speech at Edmonton, promising a "build up in the 
Pacific as rapidly as possible" to a total army and navy force of some 
43,500 ranks.2 5 However, he opposed sending Canadian troops to 
India, Burma or Singapore and he fought tooth and nail with his 
inner cabinet over the strength of a Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF) contingent. Moreover, he told his colleagues and the 
British that Canada would participate as a "Nor th American 
Nation." 2 6 The prime minister was extremely reluctant to go even 
that tar. In early March 1945, when Roosevelt suggested that Cana­
da contribute troops to help defeat the Japanese in China, Macken­
zie King was outraged. He recalled at a meeting of the cabinet war 
committee at the end of the month that he "had felt indignant at his 
[Roosevelt's] even proposing anything of the kind." At that same 
meeting the prime minister told his colleagues that "the mere desire 
of having [a] token contribution for prestige purposes was not suf-
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ficient reason for raising the conscription issue or indeed needlessly 
sacrificing lives." Regarding conscription, Mackenzie King was 
blunt: "Certainly there will be no conscription for the Far East in 
any government of which I may be the head."2 7 
There was one other factor regarding Canadian participation in 
the Pacific War that troubled Mackenzie King and that was his fear 
of the potential backlash Canada would suffer if it appeared to be 
sending troops to help resurrect Britain's Asian empire. As the prime 
minister noted in his diary in September 1944, "[t]he point I kept 
urging was that the Canadian people could not countenance our 
men serving in India, Burma or elsewhere to enable Britain to 
reconquer her colonial possessions.... [I]t would raise a political issue 
in Canada out of all proportion to the good that could be ren­
dered."2 8 The British were certainly trying to wring a commitment 
from the prime minister to contribute to a British Commonwealth 
force, but to no avail. Mackenzie King refused to commit Canadian 
troops to the British cause.2 9 
Mackenzie King's reluctance to involve Canada in the war 
against Japan explains, in large part, the immense relief and joy he 
expressed when he learned that the Russians would enter the war 
on 9 August 1945. In fact, one of the first things he did was tell a 
press gathering that the war would soon end and that "Canada 
would continue with what she had been bearing with her part [sic] 
until the final word of peace came." He then visited the Soviet 
ambassador to thank him profusely.30 From Mackenzie King's point 
of view the Soviet Union was the key to victory, and he hoped the 
war would end before Canadian troops saw action - all of which 
seemed to strengthen his belief that the bomb had been unneces­
sary.31 In the end his hopes were half-realised; the atomic bombs 
were dropped but Canadian forces never saw action. 
What conclusions can be drawn from a brief examination of 
Mackenzie King's attitude to the atomic bomb? Clearly, he 
expressed considerable misgivings about the use of nuclear weapons 
on Japan and he certainly did not support their use on racial 
grounds. The prime minister, however, was not entirely altruistic in 
expressing his apprehension. It was one matter to question the use 
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of the bomb on moral and other grounds, and quite another to 
question it when he was doing all that he could to prevent sending 
troops to defeat Japan. There is little evidence to suggest that he 
wrestled deeply with the question of how many lives would be lost 
in the final invasion. Only once, on 4 August, did he note that the 
bomb could "be justified through the knowledge that for one life 
destroyed, it may save hundreds of thousands and bring this terrible 
war quickly to a close."3 2 Mackenzie King had effectively placed 
himself in a position which allowed him to take the moral high 
ground. This was hardly surprising. In the prime minister's late-Vic­
torian outlook, technology could only improve the human condi­
tion if it were firmly guided by Christian values. The bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which brought the image of Frankenstein 
to Mackenzie King's mind, signalled the final defeat of those who 
held that there need be no conflict between science and religion. 
Forced to choose between these two sets of competing values, 
Mackenzie King instinctively chose the spiritual values which had 
defined his world-view since the late 19th-century. 
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Japanese in the interests of national security. With the receipt of this 
message, completely reversing the Command's previous stand," the 
minister of national defence, Colonel J.L. Ralston, "was anything but 
pleased."3 6 
The evidence simply does not support Pope's account. While it is clear 
that the Department of National Defence's representatives on the 
Special Committee on Measures to be Taken in the Event of War With 
Japan agreed in mid-1941 with the Committee's recommendation to 
Cabinet that "the bulk of the Japanese population in Canada can 
continue its normal activities,"3 7 and while it is equally certain in mid-
December the Chiefs of Staff Committee told the Cabinet War 
Committee that fears of a Japanese assault on BC were unwarranted, 3 8 
there is absolutely no doubt that the military commanders in British 
Columbia and the military members of the Permanent Joint Board on 
Defence were seriously concerned about the possible threat posed by the 
Japanese-Canadian population both before and after 7 December 1941. 
The real question that remains unanswered is why in this instance the 
generals, admirals and air marshals in Ottawa were so ready to ignore 
the advice of their commanders in the field. 
Certainly the military advice from BC was completely unambiguous. 
The Joint Service Committee, Pacific Coast, the key coordinating 
military body that brought together the three service commanders in 
British Columbia, had prepared plans in July 1940 for preventive 
actions directed at the Japanese Canadians in the event of war with 
Japan. 3 9 The Committee also recommended on 17 June 1941 that "the 
Japanese population [of approximately 230] residing in the vicinity of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force Advanced Base at Ucluelet [on the West 
Coast of Vancouver Island] should, in the event of an emergency, be 
evacuated for reasons of security. It was felt that similar steps should be 
taken in connection with Japanese resident near other important 
defence areas, and particularly those established near air bases." There 
were about two hundred Japanese Canadians living at Port Alice near 
the Coal Harbour R C A F base and the same number in Prince Rupert 
near another air station. The Committee's recommendations had been 
forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa no later than 20 
September 1941. 4 0 
In addition, the R C N on the coast had long been concerned with the 
fleet of up to 1,200 fishing vessels operated by Japanese Canadians. In 
1937, for example, the Navy's staff officer (intelligence) at Esquimalt 
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had said that "The fact that there are a large number of Japanese 
fishermen operating in British Columbia waters ... and having a 
thorough and practical knowledge of the coast, is in itself a matter of 
some concern to the Naval authorities."4 1 In August 1941, the. naval 
officer commanding on the coast asked Ottawa for authority to round 
up the fishing boats in the event of war. The Department of External 
Affairs refused to agree to this in toto, however, and in October orders 
were issued for seizure only of boats "owned and operated by Japanese 
nationals." "Vessels owned and operated by British subjects of Japanese 
origin," the R C N was told, "will only be interfered with where there are 
positive grounds for suspicion, comparable to those which would justify 
the internment of a British subject of Japanese origin." 4 2 When war 
came five weeks later, those orders would be overridden in the urgency 
of the moment. 
Furthermore, before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, both the 
Canadians and the Americans worried about the concentration of 
Japanese Americans and Canadians living along the common coastline. 
The Joint Service Committee, Pacific Coast, had urged Ottawa on 20 
September 1941 to coordinate any actions with Washington. In its 
opinion, "inequality in the treatment of persons of Japanese race in the 
territories of the Dominion of Canada and the United States would be 
liable to prove a source of danger to the effective prosecution of such 
measures of control as may be ordered by either government and to 
furnish grounds for grievance by the persons immediately concerned."4 3 
The Permanent Joint Board on Defence at its meeting on 10-11 
November at Montreal had also considered the question of the 
"population of Japanese racial origin." Just as the Joint Service 
Committee on the West Coast had urged, the Canadian and American 
members agreed that there should be consultation to produce "policies 
of a similar character in relation to these racial groups" if war with 
Japan broke out. The aim was "a practicable coincidence of policy."4 4 
That did not imply evacuation from the Pacific Coast, but it did suggest 
that there was a shared realization of a "problem." And as John 
Hickerson, the senior State Department official regularly concerned 
with Canadian affairs, noted after that PJBD meeting, it would "cause 
the Canadians considerable political difficulty in British Columbia if we 
adopted more rigid treatment of Japanese in California than that 
prescribed in British Columbia." That, he added, is why the Canadians 
suggest "that at the proper time there be consultation" between the two 
governments "with the view to adopting similar policies in Canada and 
in continental United States." 4 5 
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After Pearl Harbor, but before the Conference in Ottawa, the three 
senior officers on the coast wrote to Ottawa with their views. Major-
General R.O. Alexander, the GOC of Pacific Command, told the chief 
of the General Staff on 30 December that he believed "internment of 
Japanese males between the ages of 18 and 45, their removal from the 
coast and their organization into paid units on public works ... would be 
advisable." Such action, Alexander added, "might prevent inter-racial 
riots and bloodshed, and will undoubtedly do a great deal to calm the 
local population." There is no doubt that General Pope saw this letter, 
because he sent a copy of it to Hugh Keenleyside of the Department of 
External Affairs and Keenleyside wrote back to him with suggestions on 
3 January — before the "Japanese Problem" conference in Ottawa took 
place.4 6 
The senior R C A F officer in BC shared the view of his army 
colleague. Air Commodore L.F. Stevenson informed R C A F headquar­
ters in Ottawa on 2 January that security "cannot rest on precarious 
discernment between those who would actively support Japan and those 
who might at present be apathetic." If the government had doubts about 
the wisdom of moving the Japanese out, Stevenson said, "I suggest a 
strong commission be appointed immediately to ... obtain the opinion of 
a good cross section of the BC public and the officers charged with the 
defence of the Pacific Coast." The senior naval officer agreed, 
Commodore W.J.R. Beech telling his headquarters on 27 December 
that "Public opinion is very much against the Japanese all over the 
Queen Charlotte Islands and in view of the strategic position of these 
Islands I would strongly recommend that all the Japanese be 
removed."4 1 
All three officers stressed public opinion at least as much as military 
needs, and it is reasonable to assume that their positions often put them 
in close contact with politicians and journalists likely to be pressing for 
stern action. But this does not alter the fact that the responsible military 
commanders in British Columbia, after 7 December and before the 
Ottawa conference, called for removal of the Japanese Canadians from 
all or part of the coastal region; so too had their staffs urged removal 
before 7 December from the vicinity of military bases and after Pearl 
Harbor from coastal areas of the province.4 8 Moreover, on 13 February 
1942, the Joint Services Committee, Pacific Coast, decided that in view 
of "the deterioration of the situation in the Pacific theatre of war ... the 
continued presence of enemy aliens and persons of Japanese racial 
origin [in the coastal areas] constitutes a serious danger and prejudices 
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the effective defence of the Pacific Coast of Canada ." 4 9 And as late as 
26 February, the R C N commanding officer on the coast was advised by 
his security intelligence officer that "The removal of all Japanese from 
this coastal area would undoubtedly relieve what is becoming more and 
more a very dangerous situation from the point of view of sabotage and 
aid to the enemy as well as the great danger of development of inter­
racial strife." 5 0 Again, public opinion was given equal weight with the 
fear of sabotage, but it is significant that this advice was proffered after 
adult male Japanese citizens living on the coast had been ordered 
inland. 
Even after the great majority of Japanese Canadians had been 
cleared from the government's designated defence zone, moreover, 
substantial concern was expressed repeatedly by the American military 
and by the US members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence on 
26-27 May and 1 September 1942 at the relocation of Japanese 
Canadians inland to road camp sites near railway lines or other 
strategic points. Under pressure, the Canadian government then acted 
to resolve matters to reassure its ally. Similar concerns had been 
expressed in June 1942 in the British Security Coordination report. 5 1 
An additional factor that played an unquantifiable but important part 
in events in BC were the reports that Japanese living in Hawaii, Hong 
Kong and Malaya had helped the attacking Japanese forces.5 2 
Undoubtedly the lurid tales of fifth column activities from Europe in 
1940 also fed popular fears. The Hawaii stories eventually proved to be 
mere rumours, but their impact was great in the first months of 1942. In 
Hong Kong and particularly in Malaya, however, there was substantial 
truth to the reports in January and February that local Japanese had 
hidden arms and ammunition, planted explosive charges at military 
installations, docks and ships, and sniped at troops, as well as providing 
information to the invaders.5 3 It is virtually immaterial if the stories 
were true; what is important is that they circulated widely among a 
generally anti-Japanese public and a fearful military that were prepared 
to believe them. As the Vancouver Sun put it on 2 January 1942, "we 
may expect Japanese civilians to do all in their power to assist the 
attacker." 5 4 
Finally, the stories, all too true, of the brutality of the Japanese 
victors towards captured Allied servicemen and civilians had substantial 
impact on both the public and political leaders. As early as 12 February, 
telegrams from London to Ottawa spoke of atrocities against captured 
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Hong Kong prisoners and of deplorable conditions in the POW camps. 
Within the week, Cabinet ministers in Ottawa were talking about the 
fate of the Hong Kong force with their intimates, and on 10 March, the 
widespread rumours were given official sanction by statements in 
Parliament in London and Ottawa. The "devilish" Japanese, or so M.J. 
Coldwell of the CCF said in the House of Commons, would be punished 
after the war for their atrocities. The Canadian Japanese, wholly 
innocent of the crimes of the Imperial Japanese Army, nonetheless were 
denied sympathy as a result. 5 5 
Was There a Military Threat to the Coast? 
Whether there was a direct military threat to the coast from the 
Imperial Japanese forces is also worth some consideration, if only 
because the received version denies any. In September 1941, RCAF 
headquarters in Ottawa had been confident that the United States Navy 
was the ultimate guarantor of the safety of the Pacific Coast: "Unless 
the United States Navy is seriously defeated or loses its northern 
bases," Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil told his Minister, C.G. Power, all 
Canada had to do was remain in "watchful readiness" on the West 
Coast. 5 6 With that attitude in the ascendant, the coast of British 
Columbia was left "poorly defended," the words employed to describe 
matters by Robert Rossow, Jr., the American Vice-Consul in Vancou­
ver, in August 1941. 5 7 After Pearl Harbor, however, the worst possible 
case seemed to have occurred, and Canada was largely unprepared. 
Certainly there were few modern aircraft, few ships and relatively few 
trained soldiers in the area until the outbreak of war, 5 8 and it took some 
time before more could be rushed to the coast. 5 9 That caused concern. 
So too did the course of the war. The Japanese hit Pearl Harbor on 7 
December and simultaneously attacked Malaya, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines and Wake and Midway Islands. On 8 December, Japan 
occupied Thailand, captured Guam on 13 December, Wake on 24 
December, and Hong Kong on 25 December. Manila fell on 2 January, 
Singapore followed on 15 February, a staggering blow to the British 
position in Asia (and something that frightened British Columbia6 0) and 
the Imperial Japanese Navy crushed an allied fleet in the Java Sea on 
27 February, the date that the Canadian government's decision to move 
all Japanese Canadians inland was in the newspapers. Closer to home, a 
Japanese submarine had shelled Santa Barbara, California on 23 
February, two days later the "Battle of Los Angeles" took place with 
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much ammunition expended against (apparently) imaginary targets, 
and there were submarine attacks on points in Oregon. (On 20 June a 
Japanese submarine shelled Estevan point on Vancouver Island.) The 
Dutch East Indies and most of Burma were then captured in March, 
capping an extraordinary four months of conquest. 
At the beginning of June, the Japanese launched what H.P. Willmott, 
the leading historian of Pacific war strategy, called "their main 
endeavour, a twin offensive against the Aleutians," designed to draw the 
American fleet to battle to protect their territory, "and against the 
western Hawaiian Islands," intended to lead to an invasion once the 
Americans' Pacific Fleet had been destroyed. At least two plans for 
such an invasion existed before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
and one plan saw the capture of Hawaii "as preparatory to strikes 
against the United States mainland."6 ' (Whether attacks against the 
Canadian Coast were intended remains unclear until such Japanese 
military records that survived the war are searched.) Dutch Harbor, 
Alaska was attacked by carrier-based aircraft on 3 June as part of this 
plan. Four days later Kiska and Attu in the Aleutian Islands were 
taken. 
Although in retrospect the American naval victory at Midway in 
June, aided beyond measure by "Magic" intercepts, put an end to the 
Hawaiian adventure and truly marked the beginning of the end for 
Japanese imperial ambitions as a whole, its significance was not quite so 
apparent in mid-1942 as it has since become. Certainly the Canadian 
government did not slacken its defence efforts on the coast after the 
American victory. In mid-February 1942, a military appreciation 
prepared by the chiefs of staff for the minister of national defence's use 
at a secret session of Parliament noted that "probable" Japanese 
strategy included containing "North American forces in America" by 
raids on the North American Pacific seaboard. "Possible" enemy aims 
included an "invasion of the West Coast of North America," although 
the chiefs noted that "Under present conditions" such invasion was "not 
considered to be a practicable operation of war." 6 2 
The next month, with the Japanese forces seemingly roaming at will 
throughout the Pacific and with the politicians anxious to satisfy the 
public clamour for stronger local defences in British Columbia, the chief 
of the General Staff in Ottawa was estimating the possible scale of a 
Japanese attack on the Pacific Coast to be two brigades strong (i.e., two 
Japanese regiments of three battalions each or approximately 5,200 to 
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6,000 men), and he was recommending the raising of new forces.6-1 At 
the beginning of April. President Roosevelt used the occasion of the first 
meeting of the Pacific Council, made up of representatives of all the 
belligerent allies, to say that he had invited Canada because "he 
thought that Canada might do more than she was now doing."6*1 That 
disturbed Ottawa, perhaps because it mirrored British Columbia public 
opinion so clearly, and Mackenzie King hastened to discuss the matter 
with the president.6 5 
Later that month, after Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle's B-25 
bombers, launched from the carrier Hornet, had hit Tokyo, Canadian 
intelligence reports predicted that enemy aircraft carriers would launch 
retaliatory attacks against the West Coast in May. 6 6 By June, there 
were nineteen battalions on the coast, a response to Japan's invasion of 
the Aleutians and continued and growing public concern. Even so, the 
military commanders were far from satisfied. The Joint Canadian 
United States Services Committee at Prince Rupert believed that 
military strength in the area was "entirely inadequate against many 
types of attack that are possible and probable from the West." 6 7 The air 
officer commanding on the coast asked for sixteen squadrons to deal 
with the maximum scale of attack by battleships, cruisers and 
carrierborne aircraft. There were also blackouts and dimouts, and active 
plans underway in July and August 1942 for the evacuation of 
Vancouver Island and the lower mainland in the event of a Japanese 
attack. 6 8 
The Cabinet War Committee was assured by the chief of the General 
Staff in late September that he saw "no reason to fear any invasion 
from the Pacific Coast at present t ime," 6 9 but two months later the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, the highest Allied military authority, 
determined that while "carrier-borne air attacks and sporadic naval 
bombardment" were the most probable form of attack, the possibility of 
"a small scale destructive raid cannot be ignored." By that, the British 
and American planners meant "a force comprising 10/15 fast merchant 
ships carrying up to two brigades."7 0 And as late as March 1943, there 
was a flurry' of reports of Japanese activity in North American waters 
that stirred fears about a possible attack of the precise sort the planners 
had anticipated.7' In other words, and contrary to the arguments of 
those who have argued that there was never any threat from Japan to 
the coast and hence no justification on grounds of national security for 
the evacuation of the Japanese Canadians, there was a credible — if 
limited — military threat into 1943. 
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The intent of this paper was to present some new and re-state some 
old evidence on several aspects of the Japanese-Canadian question. 
What has our account done to the received version? It has pointed to 
the gross weaknesses of and wishful thinking in R C M P and military 
intelligence about the Japanese Canadians. It has demonstrated 
irrefutably that the Japanese Consulate in Vancouver had orders from 
the Foreign Ministry to employ British Columbia Nisei in information 
collection or spying. It has called into question the advice of the military 
planners in Ottawa, brought forward once more the widespread 
concerns of the senior officers and staff planners of all three armed 
forces in British Columbia, and argued that there was a limited but 
credible military threat to North America from early 1942 into 1943 
from the Imperial Japanese forces. It has noted that the attitudes of 
some Japanese Canadians by their support for Japan's war with China 
before 7 December 1941 raised understandable concerns on the part of 
British Columbians and Canadians generally. And although the 
attitudes of Japanese Canadians before and during the war have yet to 
be thoroughly studied despite all the work on the subject, Nakano's 
memoir is important for its account of the wartime attitudes and 
divisions in the community and especially so because of its resonance 
with Stephan's account of Hawaii. Finally, although little has been 
made of this here, it is certainly germane to recall that there was a war 
on and that Canada and its Allies were losing it at the beginning of 
1942. As the civil libertarian and historian Arthur Lower wrote in 
October 1941, "The temper of the Canadian people seems to be 
becoming more and more arbitrary and we are fast losing whatever 
tolerance and magnanimity we once possessed."7 2 That explains much 
that happened. 
None of this alters the conclusion that the Japanese Canadians were 
victims of the racism of the society in which they lived and an uncaring 
government that failed to defend the ideals for which its leaders claimed 
to have taken Canada and Canadians to war. Even so, this paper does 
maintain that there were military and intelligence concerns that, in the 
face of the sudden attack at Pearl Harbor, could have provided Ottawa 
with a justification for the evacuation of the Japanese Canadians from 
the coast. The government in December 1941 was unaware of much of 
the data that has since emerged, and even if it had had it all, it simply 
lacked the assessment capability to put it together. If it had had the 
information and the intelligence capacity to appraise it properly, the 
arguments for evacuation would certainly have appeared far stronger 
than they already did. 
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However arguable this case, there is, of course, no necessary 
connection between the later confiscation of property and the still later 
effort to deport the Japanese Canadians and the reasons for the 
evacuation that seemed compelling to some in January and February 
1942. The anger that persists at the evacuation might be misplaced; that 
at the confiscation of property and the attempt at deportation still seems 
wholly justifiable. In any case, this paper should demonstrate that there 
remains ample room for further work, broader interpretations and, 
perhaps, a changed emphasis in this area of research. 
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